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1Turning round the telescope.  Centre-parties and immigration and integration 
policy in Europe
Tim Bale
Politics and Contemporary European Studies, University of Sussex
A recent ‘state of the art’ review of the political science literature on migration notes 
that myriad studies ‘have provided evidence that a range of actors influence policy 
outcomes.  They  include organised interest groups, courts, ethnic groups, trade 
unions, law and order bureaucracies, police and security agencies, local actors and 
street-level bureaucrats and private actors’ (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006: 207). 
Missing from the list (although, to be fair, they later make a brief appearance in a 
table as ‘conduits of public opinion’) are organisations that one might have expected 
to have had some say  in the matter.  Their absence, however, is not unusual even if it 
is curious: as a contribution to one recent edited collection puts it, ‘political parties 
have received relatively short shrift among students of the politics of migration’; they 
‘enter the story  as minor characters with undefined roles’ (Triadafilopoulos and 
Zaslove, 2006: 171, 176)
This is almost certainly  because, with a handful of exceptions (Hammar, 1985, 
Perlmutter, 1996, Schain, 1999 and 2006, Geddes, 2003, Givens and Luedtke, 2005, 
Williams, 2006 and, interestingly, Lahav, 2004), the political science communities 
2working on asylum and immigration, on the one hand, and parties, on the other, have 
traditionally  sat at separate tables.  Leading migration scholars have rightly  nodded to 
the need to understand how the arrival of newcomers and their families impacts on 
attitudes and electoral politics (see, for example, Hollifield, 2000: 170-1).  But very 
few treat the parties that fight those elections as a vital source of state and EU policy – 
policy which for some time now has been moving towards an emphasis on restriction 
and cultural integration that borders on the coercive (see Joppke, 2007).  Meanwhile, 
scholars of contemporary party politics often talk about the backlash against 
migration and multiculturalism.  But they do so largely in two limited contexts.  The 
first is research into the phenomenon of far-right parties (see, for example, Carter, 
2005, Norris, 2005, Rydgren, 2005, and Mudde, 2007).  The second – in a manner 
reminiscent of arguments concerning public opinion and party positions on European 
integration – is the question of whether the debate on migration and multiculturalism 
cross-cuts traditional constructions of the left-right dimension or , as would seem to 
be the case, be collapsed into it (see Gabel and Anderson, 2002 and McElroy and 
Benoit, 2007).
Policy  people, in other words, don’t really do parties, while party  people do policy 
only insofar as it affects party competition and positioning.  This talking past each 
other is a great pity  for those who, in general, see merit  in joined-up political science 
rather than the logic of specialisation that encourages us all to know more and more 
about less and less.  Few of us, after all, have given up  completely  on the notion that 
there is a real world out there that  we have some kind of mission to explain.  Often we 
do this by using heuristics that make our task more manageable and our findings 
3easier to communicate.  But, if so, we need to ensure that we extract full value from 
the explanatory frameworks we employ.   Hence, if as experts on political parties we 
believe their motives and dilemmas can be usefully modelled by declaring they must 
trade off between ‘policy, office, and votes’ (Müller and Strøm, 1999) then we need to 
take the first every bit as seriously as the other two.  By the same token, if we believe, 
as many who study migration policy  believe, that, we need to focus on ‘the liberal 
state’ (Hollifield, 2000: 146-150) or on organised interests calculating costs and 
benefits (Freeman, 1995) or on inertia-prone institutions (Hansen, 2002), then it 
seems only sensible to pay attention to the ‘critical nodes’ (Triadafilopoulos and 
Zaslove, 2006: 189) that connect, influence, and are influenced by, all these things, 
namely political parties.
Why (mainstream centre-right) parties matter
Political parties matter to European public policy on migration because ‘the nation-
state is…where the majority  of the migration action lies’ (Lahav, 2004: 10) but they 
will continue to do so even if the action moves elsewhere.  Recent work by migration 
scholars emphasises the capacity and desire of EU member states not to cede 
competence in such a sensitive area unless it suits them (see, for example, Geddes, 
2003 and Messina, 2007).  But even those scholars more inclined to look for evidence 
of Europeanisation routinely emphasise that it involves the ‘uploading’ of policy to 
the EU by member states as well as its ‘downloading’ to the member states by the EU 
(Börzel, 2002). Given that the direction and detail of state policy demonstrably 
depends on who governs (Schmidt, 1996 and Imbeau et al., 2001), this means that 
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irrespective of whether states refuse or decide to cede (or at least share) sovereignty  in 
those areas.  And should things move even further beyond the state, parties will still 
count for something.  Immigration and integration may eventually become subject not 
just to instrumental intergovernmental co-operation but to full-blown community 
competence.  Even, then, however, they will be amenable to influence by political 
parties that are increasingly  coherent and cohesive at  the transnational level (see Hix 
and Noury, 2007).  In other words, it is not just in (migration) policy-making that one 
finds Europeanisation (see, for example, Lavenex, 2007): parties, too, are eventually 
affected, albeit in an equally  uneven, contested and normatively problematic manner 
(see Mair, 2006). As long, then, as representative politics remains a feature of both the 
nation-state and that which transcends (or at  least enmeshes) it, there is no escape 
from parties. 
The logical corollary of acknowledging the potential influence of parties on public 
policy in this and other areas would be to look first at those parties which have spent 
most time in government, either singly or in coalition.  One study (Givens and 
Luedtke, 2005) made a promising step in this direction, even if its discovery that there 
is more difference between left and right governments on integration policy than on 
immigration has to be tested on a wider range of countries (and over a longer 
timespan) before it can be regarded as anything more than indicative.   For some 
reason, however, most of those who have dealt with the issue of party impact have 
chosen to look, as it were, down the wrong (or at  least  the other) end of the telescope - 
at the putative influence of ‘fringe’ or ‘extremist’ parties rather than that  more 
5obviously exercised by  the ‘mainstream’ parties which by  and large have kept them, 
and continue to keep  them, out of government.  Clearly, the issue of whether these 
smaller parties have - often indirectly - influenced public policy  on immigration and 
integration is both interesting and important, as a number of stimulating studies, both 
recent (Schain, 2006, Williams, 2006, and Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove, 2006) and 
slightly older (Minkenberg, 2002), have demonstrated.    It is about time, however, 
that we turned the telescope round and trained it, too, on the parties with a more direct 
impact on public policy at and beyond the level of the state.  In this respect, parties of 
the centre-right which, despite their crucial importance to the past, current, and future 
governance of the continent, have enjoyed nowhere near the scholarly attention of 
their more radical counterparts, are an obvious point of departure.1   And what better 
journal to host such an exploration than one which concerns itself with public policy 
made at both the ‘domestic’ and the ‘European’ level, as well as in the interstices 
between the two.
Many mainstream parties that have a chance of forming – or helping to form – 
governments in contemporary Europe are under pressure to take a harder-line, more 
restrictionist and ‘assimilationist’ stance on issues of immigration and integration. 
The sources of such pressure obviously include real-world problems such as increased 
labour migration and asylum seeking, stretched border security, welfare and criminal 
justice systems, the threat of terrorism, and the evident unease about cultural 
differences in some segments of the self-styled ‘native’ population.  Mainstream 
parties are also under pressure from radical, populist  alternatives, from a media that 
‘compares immigrants in generous moments with thieves, in less generous moments 
6with sewage’ (Hansen, 2003: 32), and from their own members, supporters and 
electorates, with considerable feedback between each of these forces.  Clearly the 
perceived problems and the apparently  pressing need for solutions are in part cued 
and constructed by political (and especially government) actors (see, for example, 
Statham, 2003: 170-1, 175).  Demand is not independent of supply, as any successful 
entrepreneur – electoral as well as economic – knows.  Nor does one need to buy 
wholesale into constructivism or postmodernism to realise that, when it comes to how 
voters think about immigration and asylum, ‘perception is reality’ – particularly  when 
it comes to the numbers involved (see Sides and Citrin, 2007). But all this is true only 
up to a point.  If we are to gain an understanding of the policy  pursued by mainstream 
political parties, we have to acknowledge what for some of us may  be uncomfortable 
realities. 
In other words, even if we discount for the inflated figures bandied about by 
opponents of immigration, the decades since the end of the cold war have seen large 
numbers of people hoping to work, or take refuge from persecution, in western 
Europe.  Since 2004 these numbers have been swelled by the accession to the EU of 
twelve mainly Central and Eastern European states and may in a decade or so be 
boosted even further by the entry of Turkey.  While the numbers may  be small relative 
to the existing population, they are – or can be made to look – huge in absolute terms, 
especially if the faces, languages and cultures of the migrant population and their 
descendents seem very different.  By the same token, only a minority of entrants rely 
on, or even abuse, Europe’s welfare systems.  But some of course do, either because 
they  are encouraged to by a benefits regime that requires little in return for the 
7assistance it  provides or because they are trapped into doing so by overt and covert 
discrimination that prevents them from escaping dependence.  Similarly, it  may well 
be that ethnic minorities who are either the descendants of migrants or migrants 
themselves, are overrepresented in the criminal justice system not just because they 
are poor but also because law enforcement agencies pay them an inordinate amount of 
attention and hand them down tougher sentences.  But overrepresented they are. 
Equally, they are not the only people to be involved in terrorism in Europe, and the 
threat may indeed be exaggerated out of all proportion.  Yet, the most recent and most 
high-profile attacks have indeed been instigated by extremists from (or with roots) 
outside Europe – and their atrocities have been all too real.  It is the real world, then, 
and not just the fevered imaginings of demagogues and ill-informed, culturally 
threatened voters that poses real policy questions for politicians.
Parties operating on the centre right – our focus here – are perhaps particularly 
preoccupied with such questions.  In other words, we should expect them to care 
irrespective of (or at  least in addition to) electoral considerations.  Part of their raison 
d’etre, after all, is to defend the socio-economic and cultural status quo to which the 
entry  of large (or at least highly visible) numbers of migrants would appear to present 
something of a challenge.  Just as traditionally, they  are in favour of keeping tax low, 
ensuring law and order is maintained and national security  is protected – all aims that 
are apparently threatened by  ethnic minorities that have for some time been 
overrepresented in the welfare rolls and crime statistics (Joppke, 2007: 6), and now, in 
the era of 9/11, and the bomb attacks on Madrid and London, are thought to present 
an even more dramatic threat (see Karyotis, 2007, and also Collyer, 2006 and 
8Hampshire, forthcoming).  Parties of the centre-right also have an ambivalent 
relationship  with the parties that play up such threats: on the one hand, the far right 
may eat into their vote share (the preoccupation of much of the literature); on the 
other, it may help them into office by joining or supporting governments they  lead. 
Accordingly, calling for the tightening of borders and sounding off against the evils of 
multiculturalism might serve to counter the electoral threat from radical right wing 
populists or, by boosting the salience of the issues that such forces thrive on, it might 
increase their vote share and help  the more respectable right to win back or maintain 
office (Bale, 2003; see also Meguid, 2005).  Whatever, a hard-line stance must be 
quite a temptation, especially if it is consonant with, or no more than a logical 
extension of, one’s own ideological position.
Some migration scholars, however, would deny that there is much of a correlation 
between being on the right of centre and greater concern about inflows and greater 
insistence on integration; immigration, apparently, ‘is located at the crossroads 
between two very different semantics: those based on economic or functional issues…
and those based on culture, identity and tradition’, thus rendering ‘the distinction 
between conservative and progressive’ problematic if not meaningless (Sciortino, 
2000: 224-5).  Such assertions seem to be contradicted by empirical evidence: Lahav 
(2004: 126-132) shows that there is a clear ideological and party distinction between 
the conventional left and right on these issues and that one doesn’t have to look too 
far along the right hand side of the divide before attitudes become restrictive and 
suspicious (see also Lahav, 1997).  Put bluntly, centre right voters and the parties they 
vote are indeed more preoccupied about immigration and integration, are more likely 
9to kick up over such issues, and have been for quite some time, even in the absence of 
a significant far right threat (Perlmutter, 1996).  Expressing the desire to protect ‘us’ 
from ‘them’, whoever or whatever ‘them’ (or ‘the other’) may happen to be at the 
time, is in what Panebianco (1988) calls the ‘genetic code’ of many mainstream 
centre-right parties – and arguably, given the ‘racialised’ nature of European society 
and history, their centre-left counterparts cannot claim to be totally immune either 
(see Garner, 2005: 125).
This is a very important point.  Framing the centre right’s (and indeed the centre-
left’s) stand on immigration control and immigrant policy as purely, or at least 
primarily, a strategic response to the populist radical right implies that Europe’s 
mainstream parties are somehow incapable of coming to their own conclusions on the 
seriousness of the issues and the policy direction they  should take on them.  This is 
not only potentially patronising, it is misleading – as even scholars determined to find 
far right influence are wise enough to acknowledge in the small print (see Williams, 
2006: 69-70) .  Moreover, given the fact that  supposedly more ‘progressive’ parties 
are under as much, if not more, pressure from populist entrepreneurs aiming to steal 
their voters, the ‘far-right pressure’ frame doesn’t explain why it has so often been the 
centre-right that has made the running on immigration control and more aggressive 
integration rather than the centre-left – even if the centre left has eventually followed 
suit (see Bale et al., 2007).  If political competition is indeed about ‘issue ownership’ 
and campaigning about ‘selective emphasis’ - about parties talking past each other 
because they are preoccupied with moving the agenda onto issues on which they  are 
‘strong’ (see Budge and Farlie, 1983) -  then the centre-right has had a claim to own 
the issues we deal with here for some time.
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Little prodding needed: the record of the centre-right on immigration and 
integration
To read or hear some accounts, both in the media and in more academic work, 
however, one would think that it  is only  since the ‘rise of the far right’ that countries – 
and by implication centre-right parties – have been worrying about and taking action 
on immigration and integration.  But the now familiar notion that there was a more or 
less bipartisan (and ultimately  counterproductive) ‘conspiracy of silence’ on the part 
of the mainstream that created ‘a political space’ for the anti-immigrant extreme 
which now needs closing down (see, for example, Messina, 2007: 86-7) is 
problematic.  It did not require, for instance, a far-right threat to bring about the 
almost pan-European ‘immigration stop’ in the early 1970s. It is abundantly clear, for 
example, from the policy  debate and measures in post-war France that ‘mainstream’ 
politicians, especially (though not exclusively) on the centre-right have been active in 
this area since for well over thirty years.  True their efforts and rhetoric intensified 
after, first, 1986 and then 1993, when the Front National was clearly seen as an 
electoral threat.  But we have to remember that  the latter year also marked a dramatic 
increase in anxiety about the security  threats allegedly posed to France by (Algerian) 
migrants (see Collyer, 2006): no-one who saw or heard Charles Pasqua – France’s 
Minister of the Interior who spearheaded the government’s hard line on immigration 
and integration – in action would have argued that he was reluctantly driven into such 
a stance simply in order to head off Le Pen.  We also need to recall that  it was 1974, 
under Giscard (and Chirac) and long before Le Pen was taken so seriously, that 
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‘marked a seachange’ which saw immigrants regarded ‘more as a liability  than as an 
asset’ (Hollifield, 1994: 155).
But France was by no means alone in seeing the centre-right taking immigration and 
(albeit to a lesser extent) integration seriously  before, and not wholly because of, the 
far right (or, for that matter, Osama bin Laden).  Etzinger’s fascinating account of the 
(note, pre-Pim Fortuyn) retreat from multiculturalism - in as much as it  ever really 
existed as official policy  (see Joppke and Morawska, 2003: 1) - may not mention 
parties as much as some of us think it might (Entzinger, 2003).  But it does serve as a 
useful reminder that it was the leader of the market- or conservative-liberal VVD, 
Frits Bolkestein who, in September 1991, triggered a national debate by declaring the 
incompatibility of Islam and ‘Western values’ and insisting immigrants should adapt 
to the host culture rather than the other way around.  Unless we are willing to label a 
future European Commissioner (1999-2004) as a populist radical right-wing 
entrepreneur à la Blocher, Haider et al., then we have to acknowledge that, if it was 
this intervention that in part provoked the Dutch government to re-direct its efforts 
away from minority promotion and toward integration, it came from a mainstream not 
the extreme.
Germany is another case in point.  The CDU-CSU-FDP coalition won the first 
election of the 1980s ‘in part on the grounds that it  would “do something” about 
immigration’ (Martin, 1994: 203); at that point, however, there seems to have been 
relatively little anxiety about a resurgent far-right.  Some will of course argue that 
German politicians are, for obvious historical (and indeed diplomatic) reasons hyper-
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vigilant about such a resurgence, and that even its possible (as opposed to actual 
occurrence) can therefore be wheeled in as an explanation of their growing 
determination to crack down since, say, the late 1970s.  But  this doesn’t explain, 
firstly, why they didn’t act in the late 1960s when fears of the far-right  were more 
apparent.  Nor, secondly, does it explain why it  was the centre-right rather than the 
centre-left (presumably every bit  as sensitive to the far-right threat) that over the last 
thirty years has taken a harder line.
The argument that Germany’s centre-right acts because it fears the far-right dovetails 
with a wider presumption that mainstream politicians somehow require public opinion 
to be channelled or mediated by a populist political entrepreneur before they  act – 
even when that opinion is clearly running in one direction and can in part be 
explained by a massive absolute increase in numbers coming (or trying to come) into 
the country, as well as the fact that some of minorities already there are clearly not 
well-integrated.  Just as importantly, it ignores the indisputable point that in Germany 
the far-right never seems to make the breakthrough into national politics that in other 
countries – not  least France – is apparently responsible for policy shifting towards 
restriction and intolerance.  Perhaps if we could see beyond Germany’s Nazi past, we 
might be able to locate its mainstream politicians’ attitudes and actions on 
immigration and integration in the party system the country currently has rather than 
in the one some fear it might one day have again.  Doing this might lead us to look at, 
for example, at Germany’s constituency-based electoral system. If such a system is 
indeed part of the reason why British politicians respond so quickly to public 
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anxieties about immigrants (see Money, 1997), then might it also explain why their 
German counterparts pick up on them too?
It is perhaps no accident that it is in the UK, with its two (or two-and-a-half) party 
system and absence of a fascist past, that policy and parties have been most  closely 
tied together by migration specialists (see, for example, Spencer 1997).  But the UK 
should not be alone – something that becomes obvious the more one thinks about it. 
Given the examples of radical right-wing populist involvement in government in Italy 
and Austria (and we would also include Denmark where minority governments of the 
centre right have in recent years relied on parliamentary  support by the populist 
radical right), Garner (2005: 133) might be overstating the case when he argues that 
the racialised nature of immigration control and immigrant  policies in Europe is quite 
simply  ‘a result of mainstream politics.’  But he has a point: even outside the UK, 
what he calls ‘the logic of defence’ (ibid.) was around long before the far-right 
became a force to be reckoned with once again.
The predictable retort to this counterblast is that any failure of the extreme right in 
UK (or indeed Germany) is, at least in part, testimony  to the fact that a hard-line 
stance by the mainstream right works to close down the issue space: cue endless 
misquotations of soon-to-be prime minister Margaret Thatcher’s famous remark to a 
television interviewer in the late 1970s concerning people’s fears of being ‘swamped’ 
– a remark which, to read some accounts, seems to have single-handedly done for the 
National Front, forerunner to the today’s BNP.2   In fact, closing down the space in 
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this way  rarely  has the desired effect: once the toothpaste is out of the tube, the can of 
worms opened, the issues rarely go away – for at least four reasons.
Firstly, such issues are very  real, or at least  very threatening, for many millions of 
people (see Sides and Citrin, 2007).  Secondly, they are (to coin a phrase) media-sexy, 
consonant with classic and contemporary ‘news values’ (see Brighton and Foy, 2007) 
as well as dovetailing nicely with the political agenda of some media owners. 
Thirdly, there are enough mainstream politicians prepared to help keep the issues on 
the boil – even, as Hansen and Koehler (2005: 635-641) show, in Germany, where 
they  are supposedly so determined to head off extremists by offering an apparently 
more responsible rhetoric on immigration and integration.  And, fourthly, those 
politicians do so – at least in part  – because they think the problems warrant talking 
about and see it as their democratic duty to do so.  As Thatcher said, in the same 
television interview in 1978, ‘We are not in politics to ignore peoples’ worries: we are 
in politics to deal with them.’
There is, in fact, a fundamental question of representation here.  Matthew Gibney’s 
highly  stimulating attempt to bring together the ethics and politics of asylum gives 
only the briefest of nods to the party politics surrounding (and possibly  also driving) 
policy and public debate on the topic.  But when it does so it leads him to assert the 
increasing climate of restriction exists ‘in part because of the behaviour of 
irresponsible political elites prepared to use every card in the deck to stay in or to 
come to power’; instead, he suggests, political leaders should reduce their ‘electoral 
vulnerability’ to intolerant and arguably anti-humanitarian public opinion by, among 
15
other things, a concerted  ‘attempt to establish greater political bipartisanship  on 
asylum issues’ (Gibney, 2004: 245).  Only a fully  paid up populist, of course, would 
interpret this as a call for a cosy elite conspiracy designed to deny the people’s will, 
albeit apparently in their own best interests.   But it does run the risk of sounding a 
little like a plea for a kind of ‘permissive consensus’ that denies the right – and some 
would say the responsibility – of politicians and their parties to articulate and perhaps 
even help call forth) widespread public anxiety.  This is risky: after all, the clash of 
socially-embedded (and, yes, socially-constructed and often ill-informed and illiberal) 
opinion lies at the heart of even the thinnest conception of representative democracy 
and the good (or at least best-available) governance that is supposed to arise from it. 
Mainstream parties should not – and, despite the putative ‘end of class voting’ and 
‘partisan dealignment’ do not (see Thomassen, 2005) – float entirely free of 
supporters who expect those parties to reflect  their sometimes suspicious and even 
hostile attitude to immigration and the cultural heterogeneity that comes with it.
This genuine (and yet at the same time generated) suspicion and hostility  explain why 
it is not just the issues that hang around.  So, too, in many cases do the parties that the 
centre-right’s hard line is supposedly so cleverly designed to defeat.  This is partly 
because by talking about and acting on issues of immigration and integration, the 
mainstream parties help  maintain their salience and therefore the traction of their 
more extreme counterparts.  Whether this is by  accident or by design – especially in 
the case of centre-right parties who stand to gain in terms of their opportunities to 
form governments – is a moot point (see Bale, 2003).  Certainly, there are few centre-
right parties that have showed much reluctance when it comes to talking up the issues 
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concerned – the Swedes (notwithstanding the country’s retreat from multiculturalism 
as detailed by Soininen, 1999) and, until the mid 1990s perhaps, the Italians (Calavita, 
1994 and 2004, though see Perlmutter, 1996: 380-1) being the exceptions that seem to 
prove the rule.  Whether acknowledging this fact, and offering up as further evidence 
the more detailed contributions to the rest of this special issue, will ever make an 
impact on the gnomic pronouncements of the galacticos of the global intellectual 
circuit is another matter.  Francis Fukuyama, for example, will no doubt continue to 
insist that Europe, mired in political correctness, has failed to rise to the challenge of 
an honest and robust debate on integration – particularly of Muslims – because 
‘political parties on the center-right that should drive such a discussion have been 
intimidated by  the left through accusations of racism and old-style nationalism; they 
fear above all being tarred by the far right. This is a huge mistake. The far right will 
make a big comeback if mainstream parties fail to take up this issue in a serious 
way’ (Fukuyama, 2006: 18).
But back to reality, to the continent where the debate conducted by mainstream parties 
over immigrants and immigration was in the mid 1990s already being called 
‘chronically populist’ (Brubaker, 1995: 908) by one of the many American scholars 
who really  do know what they are talking about.  The main point, then, is that to 
privilege ‘reacting to the far right’ as the explanatory  variable for policy change on 
migration and multiculturalism effected (or urged on other parties) by the centre right 
is a mistake.  It is no more sensible than, for example, suggesting that migration flows 
themselves or public anxiety  about them – both factors which have impact on parties’ 
policy positions – are determined by the economic logic of late modern liberal 
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capitalism or globalization à la, for instance, Saskia Sassen or Alejandro Portes (see 
Hollifield, 2000: 155-7; though see also Sassen, 2006).  Most migration scholars 
reject such a simplistic analysis when it comes to political economy, so why settle for 
less when it comes to political competition?
Internal dilemmas and other influences
Talk of economics and liberalism, however, does serve as a useful warning.  We 
should not allow our desire to question the common wisdom that the mainstream right 
finds it difficult to talk and act on immigration and integration because they are cross 
cutting issues (Sciortino, 2000: 224-5; and see Perlmutter, 1996: 377) to go too far.  A 
very clear hard-line stance does indeed jar, potentially at least, with some of the core 
values of centre right parties.  An obvious example would be charity  and 
internationalism for Christian Democrats, who have always been concerned to turn 
‘strangers into friends’ (Hanley, 1994).  Another is (economic) freedom from 
interference by big government for Conservatives and Liberals.  Some tensions exist 
more in some parties, and in some countries, than in others.  They are also played out 
against a context in which both personal and factional ambition loom large, and in 
which links with traditionally  friendly interest groups also matter.  Italy, which is a 
particularly interesting case because the ‘mainstream’ centre-right (in the guise of 
Forza Italia plus sundry  smaller centrist  and Christian Democratic parties) has 
actually governed alongside the more ‘extreme’ right, the Lega Nord and the 
(increasingly  ‘respectable’) Alleanza Nationale (see Ignazi, 2005).  Prior to the 
election of 2001, Berlusconi was counselled by  his advisers to ‘ride the tiger’ of 
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immigration (Calavita, 2004: 362); after it, he sometimes appeared to be ‘contracting 
out’ policy to Bossi and Fini.  Yet the resulting, and apparently  harsh, immigration 
law that bore their names was almost certainly diluted according to a tradition 
whereby the needs of employers and the pleas of charities, both echoed by other 
parties in the right-wing coalition, lead to multiple amendments (see Zaslove, 2006) 
and unreliable implementation – a tradition which Berlusconi did little or nothing to 
change in this (or in many other) cases.
Whether the centre-right’s traditional ‘will to power’ (which might suggest a hard line 
to match public opinion) will automatically trump its ‘conscience’ or at least its 
ambivalence on immigration and integration (which might lead to something a little 
softer) is a moot point – especially since everything we know about parties tells us 
that they are not wholly  (or at least not wholly office-seeking) rational actors.  We 
also know that, however much we are convinced we can sort individual organisations 
in each country into cross-national ‘party families’, the differences between them 
often occur, and are due in no small part to their being the products of places as much 
as ideas.  While neither geography nor history is destiny, any trade-off made by 
centre-right parties between restriction and permissiveness, and between votes and 
values, is path-dependent and therefore in part contingent on the following: on 
whether the centre-right parties in question operate in sender or receiver countries; on 
their welfare state regimes; on the vulnerability of their physical borders; on their 
traditions of assimilation or multiculturalism; on other national traditions like 
Commonwealth or republican solidarity, or self-definition as an asylum country; on 
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the extent to which security  from, for example, terrorist attack is an issue; and, of 
course, on their attitude to EU enlargement, actual and potential.
Cases and questions
Hence we have tried in this special issue to select cases from countries that vary as 
much as possible on these variables, although research on migration policy and 
politics in Central and Eastern Europe, we reluctantly  concluded, was not yet 
sufficient for us expand our exploration between the ‘old’ member states.  Two 
examples of the latter hopefully provide an illustration of the range our selection 
provides: Germany  has a ‘continental’ insurance-based welfare system, is extremely 
vulnerable to land-based incursion, received immigrants as guest-workers rather than 
former colonials, previously had one of the world’s most generous asylum regimes, 
has so far avoided an attack by  Islamist terrorists, and worked hard for the 2004 
enlargement but is distinctly  cagey about Turkish entry; Great Britain, on the other 
hand, has an Anglo-Saxon welfare regime, is an island, became multicultural as a 
result of its imperial past, saw ‘her majesty’s opposition’ propose withdrawal from the 
1951 UN Convention on Refugees at the 2005 general election, has suffered multiple 
terrorist attacks in recent years, suffered a public backlash against  a supposed ‘flood’ 
of Eastern European workers following enlargement, but continues as a strong 
supporter of Turkish entry.
The immediate aim of this special issue is to map and explain the conduct and stance 
of the centre-right parties in a number of European countries (and in Europe’s unique 
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trans- or supra-national setting) on the issues of immigration and immigrant 
integration.  In so doing it acknowledges, indeed it stresses, variation - not just 
according to geography  and history, but also according to changing flows and, indeed, 
foes.  Positions or actions taken by  parties will, then, fluctuate over time even if we 
can claim to detect some underlying ideological consistency.  Shifting perceptions of 
what works, both electorally and in terms of interparty alliances also make a 
difference: the Swedish Liberals, for instance, did well out of campaigning for 
language tests in 2002 and then said virtually nothing about them in 2006, partly  in 
order to ensure their membership  (and the stability) of the centre-right’s pre-electoral 
(and, as it turned out, post-electoral) pact.  Meanwhile the British Conservatives (who 
are apparently  anxious to learn as much as they can from the Swedish example) seem 
unlikely to ‘bang on about’ immigration next  time as they did in 2005:  whatever else 
their then leader, Michael Howard, did for the party, he surely tested to destruction 
that particular route back to power, although his successor, David Cameron, will 
almost certainly hear calls for a return to populism if his Swedish-style modernisation 
doesn’t appear to be delivering the electoral goods.
But that, of course, is a very particular matter.  We are more interested in more general 
questions – ones we try to answer in the conclusion.  Firstly, while we, no more than 
others, ‘believe that parties are the sole determinants of migration 
forces’ (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove, 2006: 189), have we established that they are 
indeed more important than some give them credit for?  Secondly, how much is the 
role and behaviour of centre-right parties in particular more than a function of the 
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threat posed by parties on their far-right flank?  Thirdly, what are the internal tensions 
and dilemmas they face?
Last but not least, we need to assess whether the attempt to bring together our 
‘separate tables’ – or at least some of the diners around them – is a useful one.  Does it 
make sense for those interested in political parties to get their head around public 
policy?  Likewise, those interested in migration have won their battle to ‘bring the 
state back in’ when it  looked at  one stage as if it  might disappear under the 
fashionable weight (and essentially ‘apolitical logic’) of globalization theory (see 
Hollifield, 2000).  Having done so, is it worth their taking more seriously an 
institution that in liberal democracies is charged with steering that state and providing 
(however inadequately sometimes) linkage with the citizens from which it supposedly 
derives its legitimacy and authority?  In short, is it time for those who do policy to 
think, as a stimulating but all too brief contribution written over a decade ago 
(Perlmutter, 1996) put it, about ‘bringing parties back in’?
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